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1. Introduction
The inﬂuence of the Prisoner’s Dilemma on economics, law, political science,
sociology, and even anthropology and biology is hard to overstate. According
to JSTOR, almost 16,000 articles about it have appeared since 1960, with no
sign of slowing down: 4,400 were just in the last 10 years. It has a high proﬁle
in non-academic media too. It appears as an explanation of phenomena as
disparate as business strategy, political bargaining, gender relations and animal
behavior. Historians of social science have referred to the Prisoner’s Dilemma
as a “mainstay” (Morgan 2012: 348) and an essential “set piece” (Rodgers 2011:
64). And according to Robert Axelrod, “the two-person iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma is the E. coli of the social sciences” (quoted in McAdams 2009: 214)
As philosophers, our aim is to assess whether this development has been
worthwhile and furthered the goals of social science. We ask this question even
knowing that it cannot be answered fully in a single article. The research
programs that the Prisoner’s Dilemma has inspired are many and diverse, and
the Prisoner’s Dilemma is only one of many models that have been used in
them. In addition, social science, like science in general, has many different
goals and a judgment of worthwhileness requires a devilishly complex integra-
tion of conﬂicting considerations and values. Finally, sixty years may or may
not be a sufﬁcient span to judge. Nevertheless, we will brave giving a prima
facie case that on at least one central criterion, namely providing causal
explanations of ﬁeld phenomena involving human co-operation, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma has failed to live up to its promise.
Before we start, two clariﬁcations are in order. First, we do not wish to
criticize the use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma on moral or political grounds.
It might be that teaching and using it makes people behave more selﬁshly
and normalizes a narrow conception of rationality (Dupré 2001, Marwell and
Ames 1981). But our concern is purely methodological: has the Prisoner’s
Dilemma delivered empirical success?
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Second, we focus on the Prisoner’s Dilemma because it is the subject of this
volume, not because it is unique in the way it has been misused. Much of what
we say applies to other analyses of collective action problems, and much of
economic theory more generally. But here our focus will be on the Prisoner’s
Dilemma only. It is quite plausible that often the Prisoner’s Dilemma gets
misused just because it is uniquely famous, so scholars invoke it when instead
they should be invoking a different game, say the Stag Hunt, or another
co-ordination game (McAdams 2009). That is a mistake, but not the one we
care to correct here, if only because correcting it would call for greater use of
the very models that we argue do not provide a good return on investment
anyway.
In Section 4.2 we present an account of how the Prisoner’s Dilemma could
provide causal explanations. The heart of the paper is in Section 4.3, where we
make the case that in fact it has failed in this task. To this end, we examine in
detail a famous purported example of Prisoner’s Dilemma empirical success,
namely Axelrod’s analysis of WWI trench warfare, and argue that this success
is greatly overstated. Further, we explain why that negative verdict is likely
true generally, and not just in our case study. In Section 4.4, ﬁnally,
we address some possible defenses of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
4.2 The possibility of explanation
4.2.1 What sort of explanation?
Is the Prisoner’s Dilemma explanatory? There exists a canonical account of
explanation known as situational analysis (Koertge 1975), which was origin-
ally articulated for social science by Popper, Dray and Hempel. As Mary
Morgan, among others, has pointed out, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is particu-
larly well suited to it. According to situational analysis, social scientists do not
seek laws as such but rather work to deﬁne “a kind or type of event” (Popper,
quoted in Morgan 2012: 358). Such a type consists in certain features of a
situation, which include the circumstances (institutional, historical, environ-
mental) of agents, plus their beliefs and desires. As a second step, one adds
an analysis of what it is rational to do in these particular circumstances.
The third step is the assumption that the agents are indeed rational, and then
the explanation follows: a given phenomenon arises because rational agents
behave thus and thus in such and such situations. Since model building in
game theory follows something like this logic, the claim is that situational
analysis is how these models provide explanations. Theory building on this
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view amounts to generating a portfolio of models which represent typical
situations that arise in different domains of the social world. The Prisoner’s
Dilemma is one such model.
This leaves hanging an obvious question: exactly what sort of explanation
does situational analysis provide? Accounts of scientiﬁc explanation abound.
We will review here only the candidates most likely to apply to the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, without claiming any general superiority for one model of explan-
ation over another.
If any theory of explanation can claim to be dominant in social science it is
causal explanation. One well-known reason is its intimate connection to
interventions, because interventions in turn are the lifeblood of policymaking.
One prominent theory states that to give a causal explanation is to make a
counterfactual claim that if a hypothetical intervention changed the cause
then the effect would also be changed (Woodward 2003). We believe that
something like this is the best hope for defenders of the explanatory potential
of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. But before returning to it, we will brieﬂy mention
two other leading possibilities.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma in particular and game theory more generally is
often thought to unify social phenomena: not just many different economic
phenomena can be modeled but also political, legal, social, and personal
ones too.1 It is this unifying ambition that has earned economics more generally
the accusation of imperialism. If the Prisoner’s Dilemma really did unify phe-
nomena in an explanatory way, we would welcome that and count it to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma’s credit. But it does not. A closer look at uniﬁcationist
theories of explanation, such as Kitcher’s (1981), shows why. According to
Kitcher, in order to explain, a theory must satisfy two unifying criteria: the ﬁrst,
roughly speaking, is range, i.e. the theory must indeed address explananda from
many domains. But there is also a second criterion, which Kitcher calls strin-
gency. Roughly speaking, this demands that such a uniﬁcation not be vacuous –
a theory must rule some things out, otherwise its compatibility with many
domains is won too cheaply. Yet utility maximization, for instance, is under-
constrained: utility is deﬁned so thinly that almost anything could be an
example of its maximization. This and other similar points tell against the claim
that the Prisoner’s Dilemma explains by uniﬁcation.2 Most likely, the needed
1 And even sub-personal ones, as in Don Ross’s game-theoretical approaches to the brain (Ross
2009).
2 See Reiss (2012: 56–59) for more detail on why economic models do not satisfy uniﬁcation
theories of explanation.
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constraints would have to come from causal knowledge about the contextual
variation of judgment and choice, so causal explanation will return to the scene.
We believe that there is similarly no refuge in the notion of mathematical
explanation. Perhaps, for instance, it might be thought that the Prisoner’s
Dilemma demonstrates the mathematical reason why two agents, given cer-
tain preferences and information and a certain environmental situation, will
act in a particular way – much as statistical mechanics demonstrates the
mathematical reason why with overwhelming probability heat will ﬂow from
hot air to cold. But, ﬁrst, the notion of mathematical explanation of physical
facts is contentious and the subject of much current debate.3 And, second, in
any case it is agreed by all that to be considered seriously mathematical
explanations require empirical conﬁrmation of precisely the kind that, we
will argue, is typically absent in Prisoner’s Dilemma cases.
Return now to situational analysis. This, we submit, can be thought of as an
instance of causal explanation. When a social phenomenon is explained by the
fact that it is an instance of a Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a claim to the effect
that the structure of the situation in conjunction with the actor’s rationality
caused the outcome. This structure, the agents’ beliefs and desires, and their
rationality, are individually necessary and jointly sufﬁcient causes of the
outcome. Manipulating one of these conditions, say by changing the incentives
or the information, would turn the situation into something other than a
Prisoner’s Dilemma and a different effect would obtain. To say that a situation
is a Prisoner’s Dilemma is thus just to specify a particular causal set-up.4
What causal structure does a Prisoner’s Dilemma specify? According to
Mary Morgan, there are three identity conditions for a Prisoner’s Dilemma:
(1) the 2-by-2 matrix which gives each player two options, (2) the inequalities
that deﬁne the payoff structure, and (3) the narrative. The ﬁrst two are well-
known and uncontroversial, but the third ingredient is worth pausing on –
what is a narrative and why would one think it essential to explanation?
As a story with a beginning, middle, and end, a narrative is the standard
way of presenting the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Originally at RAND, the story was
3 See, for instance, recent work by Alan Baker, Bob Batterman, Chris Pincock, Mark Colyvan
and Otavio Bueno. For an overview see Mancuso (2011).
4 Admittedly, this claim runs afoul of the longstanding alternative according to which reason-
based explanations cannot be causal because reasons have a normative connection to actions
(e.g. Risjord 2005). If they cannot, then situational analysis is not a species of causal explan-
ation after all. We do not wish to wade into this debate here, beyond saying that reason-based
explanations routinely get re-cast as causal explanations by scientists and philosophers alike,
and arguably for good reason.
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Tosca’s and Scarpia’s attempt and failure to double-cross each other at the
end of the opera Tosca. Later on, two prisoners’ failure to cooperate against a
prosecutor became the dominant story instead. Morgan insists that this
storytelling aspect of situational analysis is essential but one that tends to
get sidelined.5 Yet in her view it makes the Prisoner’s Dilemma what it is.
First, a narrative matches the model and an actual situation – an explanan-
dum – by providing a description of the model situation that the actual
situation is supposed to match. It is thus a condition of model application.
Second, a narrative provides a general category that allows for the classiﬁca-
tion of a situation as being of a particular type. Since situational analysis
explains precisely by specifying a situation’s type, the narrative is thus also
essential to explanation (Morgan 2012: 362–363).
We think Morgan is right that the narrative does the explaining that the
matrix and inequalities alone cannot. If she isn’t right, then the whole story
about situational analysis has to be abandoned too. A narrative tells us how
informational and institutional constraints made agents behave as they did by
providing reasons for them to behave as they did. If these constraints had
been different, the agents would have behaved differently. So the narrative is
essential to the explaining.6,7
An independent motivation for thinking that narratives are necessary
for model-based explanation is provided by any view of economic models that
does not take them to establish causal mechanisms. For example, on the open
formula view of models, models by themselves do not amount to a causal
claim but only to a template for such a claim that needs to be ﬁlled in using
knowledge from outside of the model (Alexandrova 2008). This view is motiv-
ated by the numerous idealizations in economic models that cannot be relaxed
and cannot be part of a causal mechanism that explains the target phenomenon.
Accordingly, a model must instead be treated as merely a template or open
formula. It is only the causal claim developed on the basis of the open formula
that does the explaining – and is what Morgan calls the narrative.
5 Here is Ken Binmore doing such sidelining: “Such stories are not to be taken too seriously. Their
chief purpose is to serve as a reminder about who gets what payoff.” (Binmore 1994: 102)
6 The revealed preference approach would reject this account of how Prisoner’s Dilemma
causally explains, denying that we need or should appeal to reasons. (Binmore himself holds
this view, which might explain his dismissal of the role of narratives.) We discuss this in
Section 4.4.2 below.
7 This leaves open how situational analysis could be extended to cases where the actors in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma are not individual humans. We do not discuss that issue here, except to
note we don’t think there is any a priori reason why it couldn’t be.
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Accepting for now that this is how the Prisoner’s Dilemma could explain,
we move on to a potential obstacle. How could the Prisoner’s Dilemma
explain given that it is so idealized?
4.2.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma and idealization
By the standards of other models in microeconomics, the Prisoner’s Dilemma
is remarkably undemanding. The simplest version can be formulated with
only an ordinal utility function, not a cardinal one. As a result it needs only
the minimal consistency axioms on preferences (completeness, transitivity
and asymmetry) and not the more controversial rankings of lotteries that the
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximization framework
requires. In addition to this the single-shot equilibrium, i.e. defection by both
players, can be justiﬁed by dominance analysis only. It is thus not necessary to
assume that players follow Nash equilibrium and hence co-ordinate their
beliefs about each other. In this sense the Prisoner’s Dilemma relies on far
fewer controversial assumptions than do other models in game theory.
But it is still idealized nevertheless. It postulates an invariable choice of a
dominant strategy by perfectly consistent agents. Actual people are not like
this, as many experiments show, and that is already enough to query how
such a model (or model plus narrative) could be explanatory. Can idealization
ever be reconciled with explanation? Most certainly it can. Philosophers of
science have come up with various accounts to make sense of the widespread
explanatory use of seemingly false models.8 We do not need to go into the
details here. Roughly, they all come down to the same verdict: idealized
models can be explanatory in the causal sense when their falsity does not
matter, i.e. when the idealizations are true enough for the purposes at hand.
But for the Prisoner’s Dilemma this defense will generally not work.
Evidence from behavioral economics about how deeply context affects judg-
ment and choice is robust. And social situations that approximate the single-
shot or iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma either in the ﬁeld or in the laboratory
exhibit a great deal of variability in levels of co-operation, enough to raise
questions about the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s predictive value. Nevertheless, this
still leaves open the possibility that the Prisoner’s Dilemma does work in a few
important cases. We turn to that issue now.
8 See, for instance, recent work by Nancy Cartwright, Daniel Hausman, Uskali Mäki, Michael
Strevens, and Michael Weisberg. For an overview see Weisberg (2012).
Prisoner’s Dilemma doesn’t explain much 69
Comp. by: SUNDARAVARADARAJULU Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 4 Title Name: Peterson
Date:25/2/15 Time:15:39:05 Page Number: 70
4.3 The reality of non-explanation
4.3.1 Casual empiricism
Various encyclopedia entries and overview articles across economics and
philosophy discuss some of the Prisoner’s Dilemma literature’s main devel-
opments: asymmetric versions, versions with multiple moves or players,
single-person interpretations, versions with asynchronous moves, ﬁnitely
and inﬁnitely and indeﬁnitely iterated versions, iterated versions with error,
evolutionary versions, versions interpreted spatially, and many other tweaks
besides (Govindan and Wilson 2008, Michihiro 2008, Kuhn 2009). Many
of these are apparently motivated by a loose kind of responsiveness to
real-world problems and complications. After all, putative actual players of
the Prisoner’s Dilemmas will often act asynchronously or more than once, or
make errors, and so on. Certainly, the subtlety and sophistication of this work
is often impressive. Nevertheless, a striking fact about it is its overwhelmingly
theoretical focus. The underlying motivation by real-world concerns is some-
what casual. Deeper empirical applications of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, featur-
ing detailed examination of the evidence of particular real-world cases, are
remarkably thin on the ground.
The overall picture is that research muscle has been bet on theoretical
development rather than empirical applications.9 It is in fact hard to ﬁnd
serious attempts at applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain actual histor-
ical or contemporary phenomena. We have found that the instances in which
the Prisoner’s Dilemma is mentioned in empirical contexts tend to come in
two kinds. The ﬁrst kind are the purely informal mentions in textbooks, blog
posts, teaching tools or offhand remarks in the media of the sort: “Well, that’s
obviously a Prisoner’s Dilemma!”10 Clearly, merely identifying a casual simi-
larity between the Prisoner’s Dilemma and an actual situation does not count
as explanatory success. Sure, the price war between two gas stations may look
like a Prisoner’s Dilemma in some respects, but in other respects it doesn’t.
It would need to be explained why the dissimilarities do not matter.
The second kind of empirical use is far from casual. Ever since the discov-
ery and proliferation of game theory in Cold War US academia, a great many
ﬁelds in social science have adopted the language of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(among other models) to reconceive old explananda, be they in industrial
9 A lot of the Prisoner’s Dilemma literature is “empirical” in the sense that it reports on
psychological experiments. We discuss these in Section 4.4.1 below.
10 http://cheaptalk.org/2013/11/13/prisoners-dilemma-everywhere-amazon-source/
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organization or international bargaining (Erickson et al 2013, Jervis 1978).
But again, only rarely are game theory models applied carefully to speciﬁc
ﬁeld phenomena, and when they are it is not the Prisoner’s Dilemma that is
used. For the most part, the game theory models instead play a research-
structuring rather than explanatory role, deﬁning an agenda for the discip-
lines in question (see also Section 4.4.3).
4.3.2 A case study: Prisoner’s Dilemma and World War I truces
Surveying the social sciences one ﬁnds a great many instances where the
Prisoner’s Dilemma is mentioned as explaining a ﬁeld phenomenon. But the
closer one looks, the more elusive explanatory success becomes. In the limited
space here, we will support this claim via an extended analysis of one example.
Of course, a single case does not prove much by itself. But if the Prisoner’s
Dilemma’s explanatory shortcomings only become apparent when one looks
at the ﬁne details, then it is much more instructive to look at one case in depth
than at many cases superﬁcially.
The particular case we will examine is the “live-and-let-live” system that
arose in World War I (WWI) trenches, which Robert Axelrod analyzed in
terms of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in chapter 4 of his book (1984). It is the most
famous example of a detailed application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to a
particular real-world target. It is also arguably the best one too, even though
the details of Axelrod’s analysis have subsequently been challenged (see
Section 4.3.3 below).
Axelrod draws on the fascinating and detailed account of WWI trench
warfare by the historian John Ashworth (1980), itself based on extensive
letters, archives, and interviews with veterans. The “live-and-let-live” system
refers to the many informal truces that arose on the Western front. “Truces”
here covers complete non-aggression, temporary periods of non-aggression
(e.g. at mealtimes), certain areas of non-aggression (e.g. mutually recognized
“safe areas”), or many other mutual limitations on aggression (e.g. intricate
local norms covering what actions and responses were or were not “accept-
able”). The striking fact is that such truces between enemies arose spontan-
eously despite constant severe pressure against them from senior
commanders. How could this have happened?
Axelrod’s case is that, upon analysis, the implicit payoffs for each side on
the front formed a Prisoner’s Dilemma, and that this is an excellent example
of how the Prisoner’s Dilemma can illuminate a real-world phenomenon. In
particular, he argues that the situation was an indeﬁnitely iterated Prisoner’s
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Dilemma, and that co-operation – i.e. a truce – was therefore exactly the
Prisoner’s Dilemma’s prediction.11
Axelrod is quite explicit that his goal is explanation, and of multiple
explananda (1984: 71):
The main goal [of the WWI case study] is to use the theory to explain:
1) How could the live-and-let-live system have gotten started?
2) How was it sustained?
3) Why did it break down toward the end of the war?
4) Why was it characteristic of trench warfare in World War I, but of few
other wars?
A second goal is to use the historical case to suggest how the original concepts
and theory can be further elaborated.
Of course, he is well aware of the many real-life complications. But he
defends the application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma nevertheless (1984: 19):
“The value of an analysis without [the real-life complications] is that it can
help to clarify some of the subtle features. . . which might otherwise be lost in
the maze of complexities of the highly particular circumstances in which
choices must actually be made. It is the very complexity of reality which
makes the analysis of an abstract interaction so helpful as an aid to
understanding.”
Axelrod’s meaning is less clear here, but perhaps his aims can be inter-
preted as some combination of explanation, heuristic value, and understand-
ing, and maybe also the uniﬁcatory virtue of generalizability across contexts.
Certainly, these seem very reasonable goals. Indeed, if applying the Prisoner’s
Dilemma did not achieve any of these, what would be the gain from applying
it at all? So let us examine how well Axelrod’s study fares by these criteria.
Many historical details do seem to tell in its favor:
 Breaches of a truce were followed by retaliation – but only on a limited
scale. This is consistent with Tit-for-Tat.
11 In fact, of course, the indeﬁnitely iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has many other Nash equilibria
besides mutual cooperation. The analysis that Axelrod actually applies comes from his well-
known Prisoner’s Dilemma computer tournaments, the winner of which he concluded was
the Tit-for-Tat strategy with initial cooperation (Section 4.3.3). If adopted by both players,
this strategy predicts indeﬁnite mutual co-operation. Throughout this section, we will use
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” as shorthand for this richer theoretical analysis of Axelrod’s. (The main
lesson, namely the difﬁculty of establishing the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s explanatory success,
would apply still more strongly to the Prisoner’s Dilemma alone, because then we would be
faced with the additional problem of equilibrium selection too.)
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 Both sides often demonstrated their force capability – but in harmless
ways, such as by expertly shooting up a harmless barn. Axelrod argues
that Tit-for-Tat predicts that a credible threat is important to making
co-operation optimal, but that actually defecting is not optimal. Hence,
ways of establishing credibility in a non-harmful manner are to be expected.
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma predicts that iteration is crucial to maintaining a
truce. Soldiers actively sought to ensure the required continuity on each
side, even though individual units were often rotated. For instance, old
hands typically instructed newcomers carefully as to the details of the local
truce’s norms, so that those norms often greatly outlasted the time any
individual soldier spent on that front.
Perhaps Axelrod’s most striking evidence is how the live-and-let-live system
eventually broke down. The (unknowing) cause of this, he argues, was the
beginning of a policy, dictated by senior command, of frequent raids. These
were carefully prepared attacks on enemy trenches. If successful, prisoners
would be taken; if not, casualties would be proof of the attempt. As Axelrod
observes:
There was no effective way to pretend that a raid had been undertaken
when it had not. And there was no effective way to co-operate with the
enemy in a raid because neither live soldiers nor dead bodies could be
exchanged. The live-and-let-system could not cope with the disruption. . .
since raids could be ordered and monitored from headquarters, the mag-
nitude of the retaliatory raid could also be controlled, preventing a
dampening of the process. The battalions were forced to mount real attacks
on the enemy, the retaliation was undampened, and the process echoed out
of control. (Axelrod 1984: 82)
The conditions that the Prisoner’s Dilemma predicts as necessary for
co-operation were unavoidably disrupted and, Axelrod argues, it is no coinci-
dence that exactly then the truces disappeared.
We agree that many of the historical details are indeed, in Axelrod’s phrase,
“consistent with” the situation being an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.12 Never-
theless, upon closer inspection, we do not think the case yields any predictive
12 As we will see, many other details were not so consistent. But even if they all had been, this
criterion is far too weak for explanation. After all, presumably the WW1 details are all
consistent with the law of gravity too, but that does not render gravity explanatory
of them.
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or explanatory vindication of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, contrary both to
Axelrod’s account and to how that account has been widely reported.
Why this negative verdict? To begin, by Axelrod’s own admission some
elements of the story deviate from his Prisoner’s Dilemma predictions.
First, the norms of most truces were not Tit-for-Tat but more like Three-
Tits-for-Tat. That is, retaliation for the breach of a truce was typically three
times stronger than the original breach.13 Second, in practice two vital
elements to sustaining the truces were the development of what Axelrod
terms ethics and rituals: local truce norms became ritualized, and their
observance quickly acquired a moral tinge in the eyes of soldiers. Both of
these developments made truces much more robust and are crucial to
explaining those truces’ persistence, as Axelrod concedes. Yet, as Axelrod
also concedes, the Prisoner’s Dilemma says nothing about either. Indeed,
he comments (1984: 85) that this emergence of ethics would most easily be
modeled game-theoretically as a change in the players’ payoffs, i.e. potentially
as a different game altogether.
Moreover, there are several other predictive shortfalls in addition to those
remarked by Axelrod. First, Tit-for-Tat predicts that there should be no truce-
breaches at all. Again, this prediction is incorrect: breaches were common.
Second, as a result (and as Axelrod acknowledges), a series of dampening
mechanisms therefore had to be developed in order to defuse post-breach
cycles of retaliation. Again, the Tit-for-Tat analysis is silent about this vital
element for sustaining the truces. Third, it is not just that truces had to be
robust against continuous minor breaches; the bigger story is that often no
truces arose at all. Indeed, Ashworth examined regimental and other archives
in some detail to arrive at the estimate that, overall, truces existed about one-
quarter of the time (1980: 171–175). That is, on average, three-quarters of the
front was not in a condition of live-and-let-live. Again, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma is utterly silent as to why. Yet part of explaining why there were
truces is surely also an account of the difference from those cases where there
were not truces.14
Moreover again, the Prisoner’s Dilemma does not fully address two other,
related issues. The ﬁrst is how truces originated as opposed to how they
13 The Prisoner’s Dilemma itself (as opposed to Tit-for-Tat) is silent about the expected level of
retaliation, so should stand accused here merely of omission rather than error.
14 Ashworth, by contrast, does develop a detailed explanation, largely in terms of the distinction
between elite and non-elite units, and their evolving roles in the war. The escalation in the use
of raids, so emphasized by Axelrod, is only one part of this wider story. Most areas of the front
were not in a state of truce even before this escalation.
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persisted, about which it is again completely silent.15 The second is how truces
ended. This the Prisoner’s Dilemma does partly address, via Axelrod’s discus-
sion of raids. But many truces broke down for other reasons too. Ashworth
devotes most of his chapter 7 to a discussion of the intra-army dynamics,
especially between frontline and other troops, which were often the under-
lying cause of these breakdowns.
And moreover once more, Ashworth analyses several examples of strategic
sophistication that were important to the maintenance of truces but that are
not mentioned by Axelrod. One such example is the use by infantry of
gunners. In particular, gunners were persuaded to shell opposing infantry in
response to opponents’ shelling, so that opposing infantry would then pres-
surize their own gunners to stop. This was a more effective tactic for reducing
opponents’ shelling than any direct attack on hard-to-reach opposing gunners
(168). Another example: the details of how increased tunnelling beneath
enemy trenches also disrupted truces, quite separately from increased raiding
(199–202). Perhaps Axelrod’s analysis could be extended to these other
phenomena too; but in lieu of that, the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s explanatory
reach here seems limited.
We have not yet even mentioned more traditional worries about rational
choice explanations. An obvious one here is that the explanations are after-
the-fact; there are no novel predictions. Thus it is difﬁcult to rule out wishful
after-the-fact rationalization, or that other game structures might ﬁt the
evidence just as well. A second worry is that Axelrod’s crucial arguments that
the payoff structure ﬁts that of an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma are rather brief
and informal (1984: 75). Do his estimations here really convince?16 And are
the other assumptions of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, such as perfectly rational
players and perfect information, satisﬁed sufﬁciently well?
In light of these multiple shortfalls, how can it be claimed that the
Prisoner’s Dilemma explains the WWI truces? It is not empirically adequate,
and it misses crucial elements even in those areas where at face value it is
empirically adequate. Moreover, it is silent on obvious related explananda,
some of them cited as targets by Axelrod himself: not just why truces persisted
but also why they occurred on some occasions but not on others, how they
originated, and (to some degree) when and why they broke down.
15 Again, Ashworth covers this in detail (as Axelrod does report).
16 Gowa (1986) and Gelman (2008), for instance, argue that they do not. (Gowa also voices some
of our concerns about the explanatory adequacy of Axelrod’s analysis as compared to
Ashworth’s.)
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But note that there is no mystery as to what the actual causal explanations
of these various explananda are, for they are given clearly by Ashworth and
indeed in many cases are explicit in the letters of the original soldiers. Thus,
for instance, elite and non-elite units had different attitudes and incentives,
for various well-understood reasons. These in turn led to truces occurring
overwhelmingly only between non-elite units, again for well-understood
reasons. The basic logic of reciprocity that the Prisoner’s Dilemma focuses
on, meanwhile, is ubiquitously taken by both Ashworth and the original
soldiers to be so obvious as to be mentioned only brieﬂy or else simply
assumed. Next, why did breaches of truces occur frequently, even before
raiding became widespread? Ashworth explains via detailed reference to
different incentives for different units (artillery versus frontline infantry, for
instance), and to the fallibility of the mechanisms in place for controlling
individual hotheads (1980: 153–171). And so on. Removing our Prisoner’s
Dilemma lens, we see that we have perfectly adequate explanations already.
Overall, we therefore judge both that the Prisoner’s Dilemma does not
explain the WWI truces, and that we already have an alternative – namely,
historical analysis – that does. So if not explanation, what else might the
Prisoner’s Dilemma offer? What fallback options are available? It seems to us
there are two. The ﬁrst is that, explanatory failure notwithstanding, the
Prisoner’s Dilemma nevertheless does provide a deeper “insight” or “under-
standing,” at least into the speciﬁc issue of why the logic of reciprocity
sustains truces. We address this response elsewhere (Northcott and Alexan-
drova 2013). In brief, we argue that such insight is of no independent value
without explanation, except perhaps for heuristic purposes.
This leads to the second fallback position – that even if the Prisoner’s
Dilemma does not provide explanations here, still it is of heuristic value
(see also Section 4.4.3 below). In particular, presumably, it is claimed to guide
us to those strategic elements that do provide explanation. So does the
Prisoner’s Dilemma indeed add value in this way to our analysis of the
WWI truces? Alas, the details suggest not, for two reasons.
First, the Prisoner’s Dilemma did not lead to any causal explanations that
we didn’t have already. To see this, one must note a curious dialectical ju-jitsu
here. Axelrod cites many examples of soldiers’ words and actions that seem to
illustrate them thinking and acting in Prisoner’s Dilemma-like patterns. These
are used to support the claim that the Prisoner’s Dilemma is explanatory.
(This is a common move in casual applications of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
more generally.) Yet now, having abandoned the explanatory claim and
considering instead whether the Prisoner’s Dilemma might be valuable
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heuristically, these very same examples become evidence against its value
rather than for it. This is because they now show that Prisoner’s Dilemma-like
thinking was present already. Ubiquitous quotations in Ashworth, many cited
by Axelrod himself, show that soldiers were very well aware of the basic
strategic logic of reciprocity. They were also well aware of the importance of a
credible threat for deterring breaches (Ashworth 1980, 150). And well
aware too of why frequent raiding rendered truces impossible to sustain, an
outcome indeed that many ruefully anticipated even before the policy was
implemented (Ashworth 1980: 191–198).17
The second reason why the Prisoner’s Dilemma lacks heuristic value is that
it actively diverts attention away from aspects that are important. We have in
mind many of the crucial features already mentioned: how truces originated,
the causes and management of the continuous small breaches of them, the
importance of ethics and ritualization to their maintenance independent of
strategic considerations, why truces occurred in some sections of the front but
not in a majority of them, and so on.18 Understanding exactly these features is
crucial if our aim is to encourage co-operation in other contexts too – and this
wider aim is the headline one of Axelrod’s book19, and implicitly surely a
17 Ashworth reports (1980: 197): “One trench ﬁghter wrote a short tale where special cir-
cumstances . . . [enabled the truce system to survive raids]. The story starts with British and
Germans living in peace, when the British high command wants a corpse or prisoners for
identiﬁcation and orders a raid. The British soldiers are dismayed and one visits the Germans
taking a pet German dog, which had strayed into British trenches. He attempts to persuade a
German to volunteer as a prisoner, offering money and dog in exchange. The Germans
naturally refuse; but they appreciate the common predicament, and propose that if the British
call off the raid, they could have the newly dead body of a German soldier, providing he
would be given a decent burial. The exchange was concluded; the raid ofﬁcially occurred;
high command got the body; and all parties were satisﬁed. All this is ﬁction, however. . .”
This soldier’s ﬁctional tale demonstrates vividly a very clear understanding of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma’s strategic insights avant la lettre, indeed a rather more nuanced and
detailed understanding than the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s own. No need for heuristic aid here.
18 For example, a full understanding of why raiding disrupted truces goes beyond the simple
Prisoner’s Dilemma story. Ashworth summarises (1980: 198): “Raiding . . . replaced a back-
ground expectancy of trust with one of mistrust, making problematic the communication of
peace motives; raids could not be ritualised; the nature of raids precluded any basis for
exchange among adversaries; and raiding mobilised aggression otherwise controlled by
informal cliques.”
19 Axelrod summarizes (1984: 21–22) the wider lessons of the WWI case for cooperation in this
way: it can emerge spontaneously, even in the face of ofﬁcial disapproval; it can be tacit rather
than explicit; it requires iterated interaction; and it does not require friendship between the
two parties. But all these lessons are already contained in Ashworth’s historical account – and,
we argue, Ashworth establishes them rather better.
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major motivation for the Prisoner’s Dilemma literature as a whole. Yet here,
to repeat, the Prisoner’s Dilemma directs our attention away from them!
Overall, in the WWI case:
1) The Prisoner’s Dilemma is not explanatory.
2) The Prisoner’s Dilemma is not even valuable heuristically. Rather, detailed
historical research offered much greater heuristic value, as well as much
greater explanatory value.
Thus, Axelrod’s own stated goals were not achieved. More generally, if this
case is indicative then we should conclude that, at least if our currency is
causal explanations and predictions of real-world phenomena, the huge
intellectual investment in the Prisoner’s Dilemma has not been justiﬁed.
4.3.3 It’s not just Axelrod
Axelrod’s work was innovative in that he arrived at his endorsement of
Tit-for-Tat via a simulation rather than by calculation. For this reason, he
has been credited with helping to kick-start the research program of evolu-
tionary game theory. His engaging presentation also quickly won a popular
following. Nevertheless, even theorists sympathetic to the potential of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma to explain cooperation have since then largely rejected
the details of his analysis –not on the empirical grounds that we have
emphasized, but rather on theoretical grounds. In particular, other simula-
tions have not reproduced Tit-for-Tat’s superiority; indeed, often “nasty”
strategies are favored instead (e.g. Linster 1992). More generally, Axelrod’s
approach arguably suffers badly from a lack of connection to mainstream
evolutionary game theory (Binmore 2001). The conclusion is that it is dubious
that the WWI soldiers should be predicted to play Tit-for-Tat at all.
It does not follow, however, that Axelrod is therefore a misleadingly easy
target – for two reasons. First, no better analysis of the WWI case has
appeared. What strategy does best model soldiers’ behavior in the trenches?
This is neither known, nor has anyone bothered to ﬁnd out. It is true that
there are now much more sophisticated results from simulations of iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma in different environments and, thus, better theoretical
foundations. But there has been no attempt to use these improved founda-
tions to model the WWI live-and-let-live system. Until a successor analysis
has actually been applied to the WWI case, we have no reason to think it
would explain the behavior in the trenches any better than did Axelrod’s,
let alone better than Ashworth does.
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Second, it is not just that the WWI case in particular has been left ignored
by the emphasis on theory. Rather, it is that the same is true of ﬁeld cases
generally. Detailed empirical engagement is very rare.20 Of course, short of an
exhaustive survey it is hard to prove a negative thesis such as this, but we do
not think the thesis is implausible. One initial piece of evidence is that
Axelrod’s WWI study continues to be used in many textbooks as a prime
example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s supposed explanatory relevance.21
Perhaps these textbooks’ selections are just ill judged, but the point is the
perceived lack of alternative candidates.
Or consider the career of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in biology – a discipline
often cited by game theorists as fertile ground for applications. But the details
turn out to be discouraging there too, and for a familiar reason, namely a
focus on theoretical development rather than on ﬁeld investigations:
[T]he preoccupation with new and improved strategies has sometimes
distracted from the main point: explaining animal cooperation . . . Under-
standing the ambiguities surrounding the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has
stimulated 14 years of ingenious biological theorizing. Yet despite this
display of theoretical competence, there is no empirical evidence of non-
kin cooperation in a situation, natural or contrived, where the payoffs are
known to conform to a Prisoner’s Dilemma. (Clements and Stephens 1995)
And for a similarly negative verdict:
[D]espite the voluminous literature, examples of Prisoner’s Dilemma
in nature are virtually non-existent. . . Certainly, with all the intense
research and enthusiastic application of [the Prisoner’s Dilemma] to
real world situations, we may expect that we should have observed
more convincing empirical support by now if it ever were to hold as a
paradigm. . . (Johnson et al. 2002)
Payoff structures in ﬁeld cases rarely seem to match those of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, often because of the different values put on a given outcome by
different players. Johnson et al. (2002) explain why several much-reported
successes are in fact only dubiously cases of Prisoner’s Dilemma at all, such as
predator “inspection” in shoaling ﬁsh, animals cooperating to remove
20 Sunstein (2007) comes close, but even here the phenomenon in question (the failure of the
Kyoto Protocol) is explained in part by the fact that it does not have a Prisoner’s Dilemma
structure.
21 E.g. Besanko and Braeutigam (2010: 587–588) – and there are many other examples.
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parasites from each other, or lions cooperating to defend territory. The one
exception they allow is Turner and Chao’s (1999) study of an RNA virus.
Even the game theorists Nowak and Sigmund (1999: 367), while lionizing the
Turner and Chao case, concede that other claimed cases of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma occurring in nature are unproven. They also concede that, with
reference to the literature in general, “it proved much easier to do [computer]
simulations, and the empirical evidence lagged sadly behind.”
Nor does there seem good reason to expect a dramatically different story in
other disciplines. Gowa (1986), for instance, in a review of Axelrod’s 1984
book, is generally sympathetic to the application of formal modeling. Never-
theless, she argues that the simple Prisoner’s Dilemma template is unlikely to
be a useful tool for studying the complex reality of international relations.
And indeed since then bargaining models have become the norm in IR,
because they can be purpose-built to model speciﬁc cases of negotiations in
a way that the Prisoner’s Dilemma can’t be (e.g. Schultz 2001).
Overall, the Axelrod WWI case is therefore not a misleadingly soft target
amid a sea of many tougher ones. On the contrary, it remains by far the most
famous detailed application of the Prisoner’s Dilemma to a ﬁeld case for good
reason – there aren’t many others.
4.4 Defenses of Prisoner’s Dilemma
4.4.1 Laboratory experiments
As we have noted, a large portion of the Prisoner’s Dilemma literature
concerns theoretical development, in which we include the running of the
dynamics of idealized systems. Very little concerns close empirical analysis of
ﬁeld phenomena. But there is a third category that, although it is hard to
quantify precisely, in terms of sheer number of papers might form the largest
portion of all. This third category concerns psychology experiments, in
particular simulation in the laboratory of the Prisoner’s Dilemma or closely
related strategic situations. Do the human subjects’ actions in the laboratory
accord with the predictions of theory? What factors are those actions sensitive
to? Even a cursory sampling of the literature quickly reveals many candidates.
For example, how much is cooperation in a laboratory setting made more
likely if we use labeling cues (Zhong et al. 2007), if we vary payoffs asymmet-
rically (Ahn et al. 2007), if there is a prior friendship between players (Majolo
et al. 2006), if players have an empathetic personality type (Sautter et al.
2007), or if players expect cooperation from opponents (Acevedo and Krueger
80 Robert Northcott and Anna Alexandrova
Comp. by: SUNDARAVARADARAJULU Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 4 Title Name: Peterson
Date:25/2/15 Time:15:39:11 Page Number: 81
2005)? Literally thousands of articles are similar. Do they demonstrate, as it
were, an empirical wing to the Prisoner’s Dilemma literature after all? Unfor-
tunately we think not, or at least not in the right way. Here are two reasons for
this negative verdict.
First, the emphasis in most of this literature is on how a formal Prisoner’s
Dilemma analysis needs to be supplemented.22 Typically, what makes cooper-
ation more likely is investigated by manipulating things external to the
Prisoner’s Dilemma itself, such as the psychological and social factors men-
tioned above. That is, the focus of the literature is on how the Prisoner’s
Dilemma’s predictions break down and on how instead a richer account,
sensitive to otherwise unmodeled contextual factors, is necessary to improve
predictive success. This is just the same lesson as from the WWI case – only
now this lesson also holds good even in the highly controlled conﬁnes of the
psychology laboratory.
Second, an entirely different worry is perhaps even more signiﬁcant:
whatever the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s success or otherwise in the laboratory,
what ultimately matters most is its success with respect to ﬁeld phenomena.
Does it predict or explain the behavior of banks, ﬁrms, consumers, and
soldiers outside the laboratory? Surely, that must be the main motivation
for social scientists to use the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Accordingly, the main
value of the psychology ﬁndings, at least for non-psychologists, must be
instrumental – are they useful guides to ﬁeld situations? Presumably, they
would indeed be if the psychological patterns revealed in experiments carried
over reliably to ﬁeld cases. Sufﬁce to say here that such extrapolation is far
from automatic, given the huge range of new contextual cues and inputs to be
expected whenever moving from the laboratory to the ﬁeld. The issue is
the classic one of external validity, on which there is a large literature.23
So far, the ﬁeld evidence for the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not encouraging.
22 As Binmore and Shaked (2010) and others argue, other empirical work shows that, after a
period of learning, the great majority of laboratory subjects do eventually defect in one-shot
Prisoner’s Dilemma games, just as theory predicts. Nevertheless it is uncontroversial that,
initially at least, many or even most do not. It is this that has spawned the large literature
investigating what contextual factors inﬂuence such instances of cooperation.
23 Levitt and List (2007) discuss this from an economist’s perspective with regard to cooperation
speciﬁcally. Like everyone else, they conclude that external validity can rarely if ever be
assumed. This is true even of ﬁeld explananda that one might think especially close to
laboratory conditions and thus especially promising candidates, such as highly rule-conﬁned
situations in TV game shows (see, e.g., van den Assem et al. 2012 about the Split or
Steal show).
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4.4.2 Revealed preferences to the rescue?
There is another way to defend the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s explanatory power.
According to it, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not supposed to furnish explan-
ations in which people co-operate because they feel it would be better for
them and they can trust the other party to reciprocate; or fail to cooperate
because they are afraid of being taken for a ride. Although these are the
conventional articulations of what happens in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, they are
causal claims made using psychological categories such as feelings, judgments,
and fears. They assume that behavior stems in part from these inner mental
states and can be explained by them.
But a long tradition in economicsmaintains that this is exactly the wrong way
to read rational choice models. Agents in these models do not make choices
because they judge them to be rational; rather, the models are not psychological
at all. To have a preference for one option over another just is to choose the one
option when the other is available. This is the well-known revealed preference
framework. It deﬁnes preferences as choices (or hypothetical choices), thus
enforcing that economic models be interpreted purely as models that relate
observable behavior to (some) observable characteristics of social situations.24
On this view, agents cooperate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma not because they feel
they can trust each other, but rather because this is a game with an indeﬁnite
horizon in which the payoffs are such that rational agents cooperate. Although
such an explanation sounds tautologous, it isn’t. It comes with relevant counter-
factual claims, such as that (given their history of choices) agents would not
have cooperated if the game had been single-shot rather than iterated. This is
a causal counterfactual and thus can be used for causal explanation. It only
sounds tautologous because we are used to the natural and deeper psychological
reading of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in line with standard explanations of
actions. But the revealed preference reading is perfectly conceivable too,
and moreover the party line in economics is that it is in fact the correct one.
We will not discuss why the revealed preference view became popular
within economics, nor evaluate whether it is viable in general.25 Rather, our
interest here is whether even according to it the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a
promising research program for explaining actual ﬁeld cases. On this latter
issue, we make two pessimistic points.
24 Only “some” because, on the revealed preference view, data on what agents say, or on their
physiological and neurological properties, are typically not deemed admissible even though
they are perfectly observable.
25 For up-to-date interpretations, criticisms, defenses, and references, see Hausman (2012).
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First, a strict revealed preference theory of explanation seems needlessly
philistine. To the extent that we have a good explanation for the live-and-let-
live system in the WWI trenches it is in part a psychological explanation
deeply steeped in categories such as fear, credibility, and trust. This is a
general feature of social explanations – they are explanations that appeal to
beliefs and desires (Elster 2007). For the revealed preference theorist, this is
reason to dump them. But Ashworth’s WWI explanations would be greatly
impoverished if we did. In fact, not much of his rich and masterful analysis
would remain at all.
Second, even if interpreted in revealed preference terms, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma would still state false counterfactual (or actual) claims. Many more
factors affect behavior than just the ones captured by the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
But the revealed preference defense only works if an explanation is empiric-
ally adequate (ignoring for now its false behavioral claims about how people
reason). And the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s explanations aren’t empirically
adequate even in the very cases that are deemed to be its great successes, or
so we have argued. In which case, the revealed preference defense fails.
4.4.3 An agenda setter?
Even if the Prisoner’s Dilemmadoes not explainmany social phenomena,might
it still play other useful roles?Wewill discuss here two candidates. The ﬁrst role,
mentioned earlier, is heuristic. More particularly, the thought is that even if it
were not directly explanatory of individual cases, still the Prisoner’s Dilemma
might serve as an agenda-setter, structuring research. Descriptively speaking,
there is much reason to think that this has indeed happened. But normatively
speaking, is that desirable? Maybe sometimes. For example, from the beginning
the Prisoner’s Dilemma was lauded for making so clear how individual and
social optimality can diverge. Moreover, it seems convincing that it has
been heuristically useful in some individual cases, such as in inspiring frame-
works that better explain entrepreneur–venture capitalist relations (Cable and
Shane 1997). This would replicate the similar heuristic value that has been
claimed for rational choice models elsewhere, for instance in the design
of spectrum auctions (Alexandrova 2008, Northcott and Alexandrova 2009).
Nevertheless, overall we think there is reason for much caution. At a micro
level, it is all too easy via casual empiricism to claim heuristic value for the
Prisoner’s Dilemma when in fact there is none. The WWI example illustrates
this danger well – there, the Prisoner’s Dilemma arguably turned out to be of
negative heuristic value. On a larger scale, we have seen the gross
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disproportion between on one hand the huge size of the Prisoner’s Dilemma
literature and on the other hand the apparently meager number of explan-
ations of ﬁeld phenomena that this literature has achieved. Overall, the
concentration on theoretical development and laboratory experiments has
arguably been a dubious use of intellectual resources.
4.4.4 A normative role?
The second non-explanatory role that the Prisoner’s Dilemma might serve is
to reveal what is instrumentally rational. Even if it fails to predict what agents
actually did, the thought runs, still it might tell us what they should have done.
For example, given their preferences, two battalions facing each other across
WWI trenches would be well advised to cooperate; that is, if the situation is
such that they face an indeﬁnitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, then it is
rational not to defect.
There is an obvious caveat to this defense though, explicit already in its
formulation: the normative advice is good only if the situation is indeed
accurately described as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. Thus a normative perspective
offers no escape from the central problem, namely the ubiquitous signiﬁcance
in practice of richer contextual factors unmodeled by the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
4.4.5 The aims of science
Why, it might be objected, should the goal of social science be mere causal
explanations of particular events? Isn’t such an attitudemore the province of the
historian? Social science should instead be concentrating on systematic know-
ledge. The Prisoner’s Dilemma, this objection concludes, is a laudable example
of exactly that – a piece of theory that sheds light over many different cases.
In reply, we certainly agree that regularities or models that explain or that
give heuristic value over many different cases are highly desirable. But ones
that do neither are not – especially if they use up huge resources along the
way. When looking at the details, the Prisoner’s Dilemma’s explanatory
record so far is poor and its heuristic record mixed at best. The only way to
get a reliable sense of what theoretical input would actually be useful is via
detailed empirical investigations. What useful contribution – whether
explanatory, heuristic, or none at all – the Prisoner’s Dilemma makes to such
investigations cannot be known until they are tried. Therefore resources
would be better directed towards that rather than towards yet more theoret-
ical development or laboratory experiments.
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